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FILE Bldgs. 1

14 JAN 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer to the DDA
FROM : Director of Security
SUBJECT : Space Allocation Task Force
REFERENCE : DDA 77-0194, dated 11 January 1977

DA QA/QC:
12/28/00. SY

1. My memorandum of 6 January 1977 on this subject described in considerable detail the need for Office of Security elements now in the Headquarters Building to remain there. It seems appropriate to underscore that very recently this Office did move a number of components out of the Headquarters Building to the [REDACTED] Building and, in effect, what now remains of the Office of Security at Headquarters are those units requiring intimate and daily access to the security files and polygraph files maintained by the Office of Security. 25X1A

2. First I think the point should be made that I see it as totally impossible for the personnel now at Headquarters to be separated from these all important security and polygraph records. By the same token, I feel it is impossible for my immediate office to be separated spatially from these same records. In effect, therefore, we are now addressing the issue of why it is necessary for the Headquarters personnel of the Office of Security, the records of the Office of Security and my immediate office to remain at Headquarters in order to avoid a situation that I clearly view as inimical to the best interests of the Agency's security and counter-intelligence programs.

3. The central point about security and polygraph records that is often misunderstood is that these records contain data that is vitally needed in daily decision making activity throughout this Agency. All clearance actions, all personnel security emergency situations, all operational support cases involving Agency personnel, all polygraph cases pertaining to Agency personnel and associates involve a

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myriad of meetings, discussions, and contacts that bring into play the data from the security files and polygraph files. It is simply incorrect to think of these records as static and of interest to Security personnel alone. While it is true that non-Security personnel typically do not have a "hands on" relationship to our files, it is also true that the data ~~is~~ ~~is~~ ~~is~~ nature dynamic and ~~is~~ needed and used by a host of Security's customers including the Inspector General, the Office of General Counsel, the Office of Legislative Counsel, all of the offices of the DDO, DDI, DDS&T and DDA who seek clearances, security approvals, facility access approvals, authorizations for badges and credentials, etc.

4. Another vital point to be underscored is that the data contained in security and polygraph files cannot be adequately dispensed via telephone calls, be they green line, red line or whatever. It is axiomatic to the security business that proper investigative and security techniques are not adequately served by telephone methods. The stakes are too high to tolerate the intrinsic weakness of doing business by telephone. The possibilities for misunderstandings, garbles, lack of appropriate feedback, to name a few, make telephone security work dangerous and intolerable.

5. I have also insisted in my previous utterances on the matter that allowing security or polygraph records to be in motion via courier runs in the Metropolitan Washington area is also an intolerably dangerous practice. It has been a hallmark of the Agency's security program over the years that we have avoided undue risks vis-a-vis our security and polygraph files. Over the years various Congressional oversight groups have applauded the Agency's diligence in applying maximum security protection to its security and polygraph files. To move such files now to locales affording lesser security protection, i.e., away from the Headquarters Building, would inevitably draw criticism and rightly so.

6. In order to provide a background for spokesmen who in the future will be called upon to defend Security's need to stay in Headquarters Building, I have called for some examples portraying the vital relationships between the Security personnel now in Headquarters Building, the security/polygraph records now in Headquarters Building and the various customers now in the Headquarters Building. A cross section of such case examples is provided below:

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a. Congressional Inquiries: Both of the Agency Congressional oversight committees, along with the House Appropriations Committee, the House Select Committee on Assassinations and individual Senators and Congressmen provide a steady flow of inquiries about the Agency's personnel and operations. Dozens of such inquiries are received in a typical week. Proper responses to these inquiries require fast and intricate liaison typically with OGC, OLC and the IG. The actual files are typically at the fingertips of the staff officers performing this liaison. There are currently working groups, task forces and other ad hoc organizations which are studying specific problems posed by Congressional elements and our representatives on these organizations need and use the security files as they perform their required functions.

b. Civil Suits: The Agency at the present time is involved in a mass of litigations involving such organizations and personalities as the Socialist Workers Party, the Black Panthers Party, Messrs. [REDACTED] Mr. Jack Anderson, etc. Work on these cases entails full liaison between the Office of Security and the Office of General Counsel. Enormous file holdings come into play as these cases unfold and Office of Security representatives are expected to have this data readily available for the myriad of meetings and inquiries with which they are involved.

c. The [REDACTED] Case: Typical of a fast breaking personnel security/counterintelligence case impacting on the Office of Security is that involving [REDACTED] His arrest on 22 December 1976 by the FBI was well publicized. In the wake of the [REDACTED] case, dozens of meetings were held involving Security representatives along with persons from the Justice Department, the other Agency Directorates, the Office of General Counsel and others. Dozens of paper products had to be produced in the wake of the [REDACTED] arrest, most of these on short deadline. Security personnel dealing with the [REDACTED] case have had to have the security file data instantly available to support the fast breaking developments for a variety of customers including the White House.

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d. Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act Cases: The Office of Security plays an integral role in the Agency's overall mechanism to cope with Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act requests coming into the Agency. The complex liaison requirements of FOIA/PA casework are apparent. The security data that comes into play must be readily available to all Security Officers who interact on these cases with the Office of General Counsel, the other Agency Directorates and the Agency's overall FOIA/PA coordinator, among others.

e. Personnel Security Emergency Cases: Every personnel security emergency situation requires rapid response by the Office of Security and instant reliance on its data as contained in security and personnel files. In 1976 the Security Duty Office processed over 800 Incident Reports, the majority of which required follow-up actions by the Office of Security's personnel security specialists. These officers needed immediate contact with security and polygraph files as they moved out on additional interviews, liaison contacts with other agencies including the FBI and the U. S. Secret Service and notification efforts with a variety of other Agency components, to name just a few.

7. Lastly, you asked that we specifically address the "impact" of moving the Polygraph Branch from the Headquarters Building. On this point, you should bear in mind that:

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[REDACTED] (2) we have projected 1500 reinvestigation polygraph cases in 1977, and there would be untold loss of man hours in having Staff personnel tested outside the Headquarters Building; (3) technical interviews cause appreciable emotional stress in some individuals, and we appreciate our close proximity to the Office of Medical Services. We again stress that the 60,000 polygraph files are extremely sensitive, polygraph in general has come under very close Congressional scrutiny, and it would be very ill advised to store these files outside of the Headquarters Building.

8. In summary, the personnel security "action" is at Headquarters, and it would not be possible to conduct a credible security/counterintelligence program if major elements of the Office of Security are assigned elsewhere. It is not merely a matter of inconvenience, and I sincerely believe that it would be a devastating blow to a well conceived security program. It is particularly unfortunate that the proposal is being given serious consideration at this particular time, when there is such a recognized need to strengthen our personnel security/counterintelligence posture. If it is deemed necessary, I will be glad to meet with the Space Allocation Task Force in order to discuss this matter in greater detail.

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Robert W. Gambino

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DDA 77-0194

11 January 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

STATINTL

FROM : 
Executive Officer, DDA

SUBJECT : Space Allocation Task Force



1. For our next meeting of the Space Allocation Task Force, I will need a pro and con paper on the impact of moving Security out of the building. There was considerable discussion about an acceptance of the fact that most of your units in the Headquarters building require access to your files. This raised the question as to what would happen if your files were located elsewhere, which, in effect, would move all of the Office of Security now remaining in the Headquarters building to another location.

2. Also included in the paper should be a pro and con statement on moving the Polygraph Branch out of the building.

3. Incidentally, there is no consideration being given to moving the Director of Security out of the building; of course, that would be required by movement of all other Security divisions. There was, ~~of course~~, no consideration being given to moving the Headquarters Security Branch from the compound.

4. I will need the paper by COB Friday, 14 January.

5. Nothing in the above should reflect that serious consideration is being given to moving Security from the building. It is merely one of many option papers which the Task Force wants to review. Each Directorate is engaged in a similar exercise.

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